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ABSTRACT 
The transport infrastructure was majorly affected by the 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. Severe 
vertical and horizontal peak ground accelerations generated high inertial forces, land-slides, and 
liquefaction. Most of the bridges in the Hurunui, Malborough and Kaikōura districts were critical nodes to 
the railway and road networks. In total, 904 road bridges across those districts were affected. Two reached 
the life safety limit state, suffering severe damage, however, most of the affected bridges experienced only 
minor to moderate damage. This paper describes the structural performance of the most severely damaged 
bridges based on observations made from site inspections. In addition to this, several performance issues 
have arisen from this event and are posed in this paper, hopefully to be addressed in the near future. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The 14th of November 2016 (NZST) Kaikōura Earthquake was 
special in that due to it being the summation of multiple fault 
ruptures over a large spatial domain, the transportation 
network of the entire northeast portion of the South Island was 
badly affected [1, 2]. The Hurunui, Kaikōura and Marlborough 
council districts were worst affected. In these three districts 
there are over 268 State Highway bridge structures (most of 
which are made of reinforced concrete) and 636 local road 
bridge structures. Table 1 below gives a breakdown of the 
number of bridge structures in each district. 
Table 1: Number of local and State Highway bridge 
structures (includes culverts, stock underpasses, and rail 
underpasses) in the worst affected council districts.  
 Managing Authority 
Council District Local road 
(District Council) 
State Highway 
(NZ Transport 
Agency) 
Hurunui 240 105 
Marlborough 348 111 
Kaikōura 48 52 
Shortly after the Kaikōura event, two reconnaissance groups 
were dispatched from the University of Canterbury to rapidly 
assess geotechnical and road bridge structural damage within 
the three districts aforementioned. One group explored the 
Hurunui District, whilst, the other visited the Marlborough, 
and a very small portion of the Kaikōura District. At the time 
of reconnaissance, Kaikōura Township and the whole of the 
Kaikōura District south of Okiwi Bay (30 km north of 
Kaikōura Town) was inaccessible by land and so no 
descriptions of damage to bridges in that area are given in this 
paper. A total of 28 bridges were inspected over the course of 
the reconnaissance: 11 in the Hurunui District, 14 in the 
Marlborough district and 3 in the Kaikōura District. A table of 
the bridges inspected is given together with a map of their 
locations in Figure 1 and 2. The aim of this paper is to present 
general observations for the performance of road bridges in 
the Kaikōura Earthquake.  
The description of the performance of the inspected road 
bridges is structured into two levels in this paper. In the first 
level, the bridges are grouped according to the different 
council districts. This was chosen as a clear method to 
categorize bridges spatially in relation to the fault rupture 
sequence and implicitly capture spatial variation in ground 
shaking intensity. In the second level, the damage observations 
in each district are grouped within the different eras of design 
(based on reference [3]) dictated by changes in the New 
Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) Bridge Manual (BM). 
This was chosen to attempt to capture the relationship between 
seismic performance and improvement in seismic design 
practice. The observations in this paper are focused more on 
structural damage, however, basic descriptions of geotechnical 
and utility damage are also presented to provide a complete 
picture of the observed damage related to bridges and their 
approaches. More details regarding geotechnical observations 
from the Kaikōura Earthquake can be found in Stringer et al. 
[4]. Of the bridges inspected, several displayed interesting and 
also complex damage patterns and for four of those bridges, 
simplified, damage schematics are provided to show the 
distribution of damage and indicate their response during the 
earthquake. 
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Figure 1: Map of bridges inspected in the Hurunui District with maximum measured PGA (vertical and horizontal data sourced 
from [5]) and NZS 1170.5: 2004 Hazard Factor contours overlaid. 
 
Figure 2: Map of bridges inspected in the Kaikōura and Marlborough Districts with maximum measured PGA (vertical and 
horizontal data sourced from [2]) and NZS 1170.5: 2004 Hazard Factor contours overlaid. 
SEISMIC DEMAND 
There was large spatial variation in shaking intensity not just 
between each district but also within each district Figure 1 and 
2 show the distribution of maximum horizontal and vertical 
peak ground accelerations; location and damage levels of the 
bridges inspected during the reconnaissance; and the Seismic 
Hazard Factors according to NZS1170.5: 2004. The figures 
confirm that as expected more severe damage occurred where 
shaking intensity was greatest.  
The highest levels of structural damage occurred near Waiau 
Township in the Hurunui district close to the epicentre of the 
earthquake. Seven moderately damaged bridges were located 
on SH 1S stretching from Okiwi Bay to just north of Seddon 
(SEDS instrument station). 
Judging the level of damage based on shaking intensity is 
inadequate because it does not indicate the spectral 
characteristics of the ground motion experienced by the 
bridges or by how much each bridge’s design capacity was 
exceeded. Both of which are important points to be known 
given the large range of ages of affected bridges, the variation 
in dynamic properties between bridges, and most importantly, 
the variation in design philosophy and seismic detailing which 
can dictate either desirable or undesirable performance of the 
bridges during an earthquake. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the 
geometric mean (of the two horizontal components) of the 5% 
damped elastic horizontal pseudo-spectral accelerations 
measured in Waiau (WTMC station: Te Mara Farm Waiau), 
Ward (WDFS station: Ward Fire Station) and Kaikōura (KIKS 
station: Kaikōura Strong Motion Station). 
Overlaid on Figures 3, 4 and 5 are the NZ elastic design 
spectra used during three design eras: 1930’s to mid 1960’s, 
1965 to 1987, and 2004 to present. The present day elastic 
design spectra was taken from NZS1170.5:2004. It was 
obtained for a Bridge Manual Importance Level 2 (1/1000-
year annual probability of exceedance, ULS) structure, sited 
on soil corresponding to the station locations (soil class C: 
WTMC [6]; soil class D: WDFS [6], and soil class B: KIKS 
[6]), and having a Hazard factor Z = 0.45, with no near fault 
effects. The two oldest design spectra (based on working stress 
design) were taken from [1] and modified for compatibility 
with limit state design. In terms of the spectral characteristics 
of the measured shaking, it can be seen that at the WTMC and 
WDFS stations very large short period accelerations far 
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exceeding the NZS1170.5 1/1000 year annual probability of 
exceedance design spectra occurred. At WTMC the spike in 
the geometric mean pseudo-acceleration (3.14g) occurred at a 
period of 0.29s. In contrast, the shaking observed in Kaikōura 
was well below the 1/1000 annual probability of exceedance 
design spectra with the shape of the spectral curve being 
relatively constant for periods larger than about 0.75s. The 
Kaikōura recording station is located on rock and this would 
be one of the reasons for the reduced spectral accelerations. 
The spikes seen in the short period range for the WTMC and 
WDFS spectra are most likely related to near fault effects as 
some of the recording stations were sited very close to 
locations of observed surface fault rupturing (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 3: Geometric mean of the pseudo-spectral 
acceleration measured at WTMC strong motion station. 
 
 
Figure 4: Geometric mean of the pseudo-spectral 
acceleration measured at WDFS strong motion station. 
 
Figure 5: Geometric mean of the pseudo-spectral 
acceleration measured at KIKS strong motion station. 
 
 
Figure 6: Map of inspected bridges overlaid with surface 
fault rupture observations based on reference [7]. 
Across all elastic spectral plots the two oldest design spectra 
were greatly exceeded. Many of the bridges inspected after the 
earthquake would have elastic periods of vibration within the 
range of 0.2 s to 1.0s which is coincidently the period of 
vibration where ground shaking at Waiau and Ward greatly 
exceeded the modern design spectra (Figure 3 and 4). In the 
Hurunui district the bridges inspected had a transverse period 
of vibration in the range of 0.2s to 0.6s and the pseudo-
spectral acceleration experienced by these bridges greatly 
exceeded 1.5g. Whilst in the Marlborough region, for the 
bridges in the vicinity of the WDFS strong motion station, had 
a period of vibration in the transverse direction less than 0.2s 
due to those bridges using stiff wall piers, leading them to be 
subjected to a horizontal pseudo-spectral acceleration greater 
than 2g. 
Another interesting point regarding the seismic demand 
imposed by the Kaikōura Earthquake is the extremely high 
vertical accelerations in Waiau and Ward (WTMC and WDFS 
in Figure 1 and 2). The vertical peak ground acceleration 
(PGA) in Waiau was measured to be 2.7g [8] and damage 
linked to high vertical accelerations was observed and will be 
elaborated upon further in this paper.  
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HURUNUI DISTRICT 
A total of 11 bridges were inspected in the Hurunui district: 
one at the intersection of Leslie Hills road with SH7; three on 
SH7 just north of Culverden; two on SH7A near Hanmer 
Springs holiday park; one on SH70 at the southern entrance of 
Waiau Township; one on River Road at the north-western 
entrance (Leslie Hills road direction) of Waiau Township; and 
three on the Inland Road (linking Waiau to Kiakoura) between 
Waiau and Mount Lyford. Apart from the Stinking Stream 
Bridge on SH7, most of the bridges west of the epicentre 
(Figure 1) along SH7 and SH7A did not show any significant 
signs of earthquake damage. However, the bridges northeast of 
the epicentre (Figure 1) close to Waiau Township and along 
the Inland Road suffered moderate to high levels of 
earthquake damage. 
The three bridges inspected on SH7 are single span bridges, of 
which the Stinking Stream Bridge and the Brown Stream 
Bridge have precast deck beams, while the Glenallan Stream 
Bridge is a cast-in-situ arch bridge. The Stinking Stream 
Bridge sustained moderate damage due to lateral spreading 
effects, causing approach settlement, and displacement of the 
wing walls along with minor cracking; which led to a speed 
restriction being placed on the bridge. The other two bridges 
had minor cracking, but were mostly unaffected in terms of 
operations. 
The other bridges west of the epicentre were not seriously 
affected either. The Leslie Hills Road Bridge was unaffected 
by the earthquake and is a two span steel composite deck 
bridge. Of particular note with this bridge is that the span over 
the river channel has an obvious sag which could lead one to 
believe that the deck buckled due to lateral spreading. 
However, it is the authors understanding that the distortion of 
the deck existed prior to the earthquake due to a pier being lost 
in a flood. Similarly, the Waiau Ferry Bridge on SH7A, a 
single span steel truss bridge, was unaffected by the 
earthquake. However, the Hanmer River Bridge located 
further north on SH7A, a multi-span bridge with precast 
concrete beams supported on wall piers, did suffer damage at 
the wingwalls due to lateral spreading along with minor 
approach settlement. Damage caused by pounding at the 
abutments was observed along with some displacement at the 
seals, joints and bearings, due to transverse ground shaking. 
Nevertheless this bridge was open without any restrictions. 
Figure 7 shows a selection of photos of the bridges west of the 
epicentre. 
The bridges inspected north east of the epicentre include: 
Waiau River Bridge, Mason River Bridge, Lower Mason 
River Bridge, Lottery River Bridge, and the Wandle River 
Bridge. The damage sustained to these bridges was substantial 
and will be described in detail below according to design era. 
Early Seismic Standards – 1930’s to Mid 1970’s 
The single-lane Waiau River Bridge (Figure 8) was built in 
1965. The bridge is a thirty three span, simply supported, 
precast beam bridge with five, 17m, I - Beam units making up 
the superstructure. The superstructure is supported by seat 
abutments and thirty two wall piers typically 4m wide but 
7.25m wide at each of the two passing bays. The beams and 
diaphragms between them sit on 12mm thick full-width 
neoprene strip bearings at each of the supports, and is 
restrained by dowels holding the end diaphragms of the deck 
at the piers and abutments. 
Damage sustained by the Waiau River Bridge was moderate, 
with the bridge being operated under speed restrictions. The 
second and third spans of the bridge on the west side was 
observed to have been rotated in plan view (Figure 8c). This 
was clearly visible from the closed expansion gaps at pier 3 
(upstream side), which showed slight signs of transverse 
rotation towards the upstream side. However, there was no 
sign of localized pounding damage despite the residual deck 
displacements. Also, the abutments showed signs of rotation 
along with some soil subsidence; pile exposure was observed 
at the eastern end and extreme abutment cracking at the west 
end of the bridge (Figure 8d) Most piers showed cracks at the 
pier-pile cap interface with some minor spalling, while at 
some piers near the waterway, longitudinal bar exposure and 
buckling was observed as well (Figure 8e)  
 
(a) Glenallan Stream Bridge SH7 
 
(b) Stinking Stream Bridge SH7 
 
(c) Waiau Ferry Bridge SH7A 
 
(d) Hanmer River Bridge SH7A 
Figure 7: Bridges inspected west of the epicentre.
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(a) Oblique View 
 
(b) View from top of deck 
 
(c) Rotation of span 2 and 3 
 
(d) Cracks and rotation on the western abutment 
    
(e) Cracking and buckling at the base of pier 
Figure 8: Waiau River Bridge SH70 and damage observed at 
the Waiau River Bridge. 
From the preliminary performance observations, the Waiau 
River Bridge structure seems to be quite a rigid structure in the 
transverse direction, due to the wall pier stiffness. Strong 
ground shaking was experienced; however this did not damage 
the structure significantly apart from the deck gap openings at 
the passing bay transitions and bar buckling at the base of the 
piers due to the lack of transverse tie reinforcement. The 
liquefaction ejecta observed at the site in the mid and the 
eastern end of the bridge was relatively minor, but apparently 
did not affect the structure. The deck rotation observed was 
mainly due to the transverse rotation of pier 3 possibly caused 
by combined effect of settlement and ground shaking. The 
damage at the approaches and abutments was more significant 
due to soil subsidence and lateral spreading effects that caused 
large cracks in the soil embankments. The observations 
indicated a good overall structural performance of the bridge. 
Early Ductile Standards – Mid 1970’s to Late 1980’s 
The Mason River, Lower Mason River, Lottery River, and 
Wandle River bridges (Figure 9) were constructed in the 
period ranging from 1980 to 1987. All of these bridges are 
structurally similar to each other. They all are multi-span 
precast concrete bridges supported on single column piers with 
hammer head pier caps, and are composed of twelve, eight, six 
and three spans, respectively. The Lottery and Lower Mason 
River bridges have simply supported 20m precast I-beams, 
while, the Mason River and Wandle River bridges have 16-
18m precast double hollow core beam units. 
The Lower Mason (Figure 9b) and Lottery River (Figure 9c) 
bridges are identical in the way they resist lateral loading. 
These structures have been seismically split in two: 
longitudinal interaction between each half of the bridge has 
been isolated by a movement joint with knock off detail, 
whilst, transverse interaction has been isolated by the omission 
of transverse shear keys at the central pier. In addition to this, 
these bridges use a rudimentary form of seismic isolation 
under transverse loading, whereby there is a large gap between 
the deck beams and the transverse shear keys such that they 
may displace an appreciable amount on the supporting 
elastomeric bearings before contacting the shear keys. This 
design approach therefore makes use of the low lateral 
stiffness of the bearings to elongate the period of the structure. 
There are no transverse shear keys at the abutments. In the 
longitudinal direction, lateral loads are directly transferred to 
each of the piers through bearing of the deck diaphragms on 
concrete upstands working as shear keys. Also, the deck 
beams are tied together longitudinally by tight linkages and a 
continuous deck between spans, except, over the central pier 
There are no longitudinal linkages at the abutments but the 
beams rest on wide seats. Therefore, all piers resist 
longitudinal lateral loading, except the central pier which is 
effectively much more flexible having no shear keys. 
Transverse load is transferred to all piers through the bearings 
but under large displacement response, when the beams 
contact shear keys, the central pier has lower stiffness than the 
other piers and will carry lower loads than the others. Until the 
beams contact the shear keys the overall transverse response 
can be thought of as rigid body translation of each half of the 
superstructure. 
The Mason River Bridge (Figure 9a) is split in two with a 
central movement joint similar to the Lower Mason and 
Lottery River bridges. There are transverse shear keys at the 
abutments and “tight” internal longitudinal shear keys and 
linkage bars over all of the piers except the central pier At the 
central pier, provision is made for longitudinal movement with 
loose linkage bars but steel plate lateral support stubs cast into 
the piers restrain the transverse movement. Therefore, the 
overall transverse response can be thought of as the deck 
having a curved displaced shape where the largest transverse 
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displacement occurs at the central pier with the abutments 
providing a “pin” restraint. 
The Wandle River Bridge (Figure 9d) is curved in plan and 
has a slope in the longitudinal direction. Linkages, shear keys 
and elastomeric bearings restrain the transverse and 
longitudinal movement over the piers, but only linkage bars 
resist both the transverse and longitudinal movement at the 
abutments. Longitudinal movement towards the backfill at the 
abutments is resisted by the abutment back-wall which is cast 
against the beams with a 6mm separation gap.  
 
(a) Mason River Bridge – River Road 
 
(b) Lower Mason River Bridge - Inland Road 
 
 
(c) Lottery River Bridge - Inland Road 
 
(d) Wandle River Bridge – Inland Road 
Figure 9: Bridges designed during the era of early ductile 
standards in the Hurunui district. 
 
(a) Plastic hinge zone and fractured bars – Lower Mason  
 
(b) Plastic hinge zone  - Lottery River 
 
(c) Plastic hinges in piers - Mason River 
 
(d) Plastic hinge and spalling - Wandle River 
 
(e) Tilting of pier - Wandle River 
Figure 10: Pier damage sustained by Hurunui district 
bridges designed to the early NZ ductile standards.
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Figure 11: Damage schematics for the Lower Mason River Bridge. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Damage schematics for Wandle River Bridge. 
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The Lower Mason and Lottery River bridges suffered similar 
damage. Observed damage common to both bridges included: 
damage to the knock-off block at the central pier movement 
joint (Figure 13a); failure of the abutment knock- off blocks; 
residual displacement of most of the elastomeric bearing pads 
at the piers and abutments; and residual displacements at the 
central pier and abutment movement joints. Unseating of the 
deck beams only occurred at the Lower Mason River Bridge 
(Figure 13b), where, at each abutment one deck beam (on 
opposite sides) was observed to be unseated off the supporting 
elastomeric bearing. The piers suffered extensive damage at 
both bridges, where all piers except the central one formed 
fully developed plastic hinges at the base. Extensive cover 
spalling, and a significant number of buckled and fractured 
longitudinal bars were seen at the Lower Mason River Bridge 
(Figure 10a and 11). Pier damage at the Lottery River Bridge 
was similar but there was no evidence of bar fracture (Figure 
10b).  
Similar damage observations were made for the Mason River 
Bridge, where the deck joints had opened or closed, and pier 
plastic hinges with bar buckling and concrete spalling were 
observed with increasing degree of damage towards the centre 
pier (Figure 10c). The pier damage pattern was interesting at 
this bridge as concrete spalling and rebar exposure occurred 
mainly on the south side of the piers (transverse loading 
direction) and tended to be more in the longitudinal loading 
direction close to the abutments.  
Extensive damage was observed to the Wandle River Bridge 
(Figure 12) which included: separation between the hollow 
core deck units at the south end of the bridge; translation of 
deck units in the downstream direction; hinging and rotating 
of piers towards the upstream side (in the direction of 
increasing radius of curvature); opening of the deck joints at 
the abutments, along with significant approach damage 
(Figure 10d and 10e). 
The preliminary performance analysis on the Lower Mason 
River and Lottery River bridges indicates that both bridges 
were highly loaded both in the transverse and longitudinal 
directions with the damage level exceeding the life safety 
performance limit causing the piers to develop plastic hinges 
in all piers with less severe hinging observed at the central pier 
of the Lower Mason bridge. All of the knock-off devices at the 
movement joints were damaged. It is probable that the knock-
off blocks at the abutment movement joints failed first, 
increasing the displacement demand of the bridges and 
creating pounding of the abutments. This was probably 
followed by failure of the central movement joint. Finally, this 
situation led to an asymmetric unseating of the beams from 
their bearings at the abutments of the Lower Mason Bridge. 
Bearing movement was observed at the Lottery River Bridge, 
but, no unseating occurred. Also, the abutments were 
subjected to lateral spreading of the soil and probably some 
slight settlement. 
The same conjectured response can be extended to the Mason 
River and Wandle River bridges, as most of the damage was 
purely due to ground shaking. The piers performed well, as 
they developed plastic hinges at the pier bases and went 
through the expected failure mechanism. However, significant 
instability was visible in the curved Wandle Bridge, where 
most likely all orthogonal motions were interacting with the 
bridge structure, causing large displacements (leading to 
probable failure of transverse tie-rods, if present) and 
separation gaps between some of the deck beam units. It is 
also believed that the excessive residual tilt of the piers is not 
only due to plastic hinging but may also result from the 
asymmetric transverse stiffness (from the curved plan layout), 
causing ratcheting in the structure. The layout results in 
greater transverse stiffness in the downstream direction due to 
arching action between the abutments, relative to the upstream 
direction, where the bridge is only restrained by linkage bars 
at the abutments; leading to hinging and residual tilts towards 
the less stiffer upstream direction. Additional contribution to 
the tilt may also be possibly due to failure of the foundations 
due to the pier piles being quite short.  However, the piles are 
founded in rock so residual displacement from the piles was 
probably small. 
  
(a) Compression failure of the expansion joint over the 
central pier 
 
(b) Residual displacement of bearing (left in image), 
unseating from elastomeric bearing (right in image)  
Figure 13: Observed superstructure damage at the Lower 
Mason River Bridge. 
Geotechnical Observations 
Most of the bridges in the Hurunui District suffered from 
approach settlement, resulting in minor to moderate 
disturbances in operation of the bridges. Almost all bridges 
northeast of the epicentre had gravel fill added after the 
earthquake to the approaches to accommodate these 
significant approach settlements. Evidence of liquefaction and 
lateral spreading were observed in the bridge surrounds at 
most of the surveyed sites. The typical damage observations 
related to these geotechnical phenomena included minor 
rotation in the abutments, subsidence in the approach 
embankment zones, and relatively minor approach and 
pavement damage in the form of longitudinal and transverse 
cracking. Even though there were significant signs of 
liquefaction and lateral spreading around the bridges 
inspected, this did not seem to cause any direct, significant, 
impact on the structural integrity or operation of the bridges 
themselves beyond the approach settlements which were 
easily addressed. Figure 14 shows some typical examples of 
the geotechnical damage observed at the bridges inspected in 
the Hurunui district
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(a) Embankment failure 
due to lateral spreading 
(Hanmer River Bridge)  
 
(b) Embankment failure 
due to lateral spreading 
(Waiau River Bridge) 
 
(c) Liquefaction ejecta near 
central pier. (Mason River 
Bridge) 
 
(d) Ground offset with 
foundation (Mason River 
Bridge) 
Figure 14: Geotechnical observations in the Hurunui 
District, within bridge vicinity. 
Non-Structural Elements and Utilities 
Guardrail damage was seen at the Waiau, Lower Mason, and 
Lottery River bridges (Figure 15a-d). At the Waiau River 
Bridge this was due to deck rotation; at the Lower Mason 
River Bridge, it was due to approach settlement and 
compression failure of the movement joint over the central 
pier; and at Lottery River Bridge, it was due to lateral deck 
offset and approach settlement (Figure 16a-c). Services were 
located on Stinking Stream, Waiau Ferry, Hanmer River, 
Waiau River, Lower Mason River and the Lottery River 
Bridges. However, damage was only observed at three of these 
bridges. At the Hanmer River Bridge, the telecom cable was 
observed to have been stretched and ruptured along with 
damage to the duct at both ends. The water pipes at the Lower 
Mason River Bridge had ruptured at the abutments and the 
central expansion joint, and at the time of the reconnaissance 
had already been repaired at those sections. The telecom cable 
duct on the other side of the bridge was observed to have 
broken at the abutments. At the time of survey, the pipes at the 
Lottery River Bridge were intact but there was evidence that 
minor pipe repairs had been carried out at different sections, 
most likely related to earthquake damage given the amount of 
residual deck displacement observed. 
 
(a) Waiau River Bridge 
 
(b) Lower Mason River 
Bridge 
 
(c) Lottery River Bridge – 
approach 
 
(d) Lottery River Bridge – 
deck offset 
Figure 15: Observed guard rail failures. 
 
(a) Telecom cable (Hanmer River Bridge)  
   
(b) Water pipe (Lower Mason Bridge) 
 
(c) Telecom line (Lower Mason Bridge) 
Figure 16: Services damage at Hurunui district bridges. 
 
(d) (c) 
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KAIKŌURA DISTRICT 
In the Kaikōura District, a total of three road bridges were 
inspected: Mororimu Stream, Mororimu Overbridge, and 
Clarence River Bridge. All three are on SH1 north of 
Kaikōura. At the time of the reconnaissance, the southernmost 
bridge which could be accessed by SH1 north of Kaikōura was 
the Mororimu stream bridge. This was due to substantial 
landslides at the southern end of Okiwi Bay (25km north of 
Kaikōura) blocking road access further south (Figure 17). 
 
(a) Okiwi Bay 
 
(b) Close up of slip 
Figure 17: Landslide at the southern end of Okiwi Bay. 
Early Seismic Standards – 1930’s to Mid-1970’s 
The Mororimu Stream Bridge and Mororimu Overbridge 
(Figure 18) were constructed in 1951. These bridges are cast 
in-situ integral structures and are supported on piers with strip 
footing foundations. They are close in proximity to one 
another, being located only about 100m apart. Other than these 
similarities there are many differences between the two 
structures: the Mororimu Stream Bridge has 3 spans, whilst 
the overbridge has 4 spans; the stream bridge uses wall piers, 
while, the overbridge uses multi-column bents (4 column 
bents for the outer spans and a portal frame for the central 
pier); and the stream bridge is both longitudinally sloped and 
curved horizontally, while, the overbridge is level and straight. 
 
(a) Mororimu Stream Bridge 
 
(b) Mororimu Overbridge 
Figure 18: General view of the Mororimu bridges. 
The structural damage observed at the Mororimu Stream 
Bridge was mainly confined to the substructure, with only one 
transverse crack found at the underside of the deck on the 
stream side of the western pier (Figure 19). Both of the 
abutments were extensively cracked along with the tops of the 
abutment columns. Horizontal cracking at the tops of the piers 
was also observed (Figure 19c). 
The distribution of damage at the Mororimu Overbridge was 
different than at the stream bridge, because the pier system 
was column bents instead of wall piers. Cracking was 
observed at the tops of the abutment columns as well as the 
tops of the columns at each of the pier bents (Figure 20). At 
the central pier (a two column portal frame bent), cracking 
was extensive around the knee joints of the portal frame bent 
(Figure 20c). Concrete spalling tended to occur at the tops of 
the shortest columns at each of the bents resulting in exposed 
reinforcing (Figure 20d). 
 
(a) Abutment cracking 
 
(b) Abutment column cracking 
 
(c) Horizontal cracking at the 
top of a pier 
 
(d) Transverse cracking of the 
soffit near a pier 
Figure 19: Damage at the Mororimu Stream Bridge. 
 
(a) Abutment column cracking 
 
(b) Spalling at the top of the 
column bent 
 
(c) Cracking below knee joint 
of central pier 
 
(d) Close up of exposed bar at 
the top of a column 
Figure 20: Damage at the Mororimu Overbridge. 
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Early Ductile Standards – Mid 1970’s to Late 1980’s 
The Clarence River Bridge (Figure 21), built in 1975, 
seismically strengthened in 2007, and was the most significant 
structure visited in the Kaikōura District. It is a 6 span, 
balanced cantilever single cell box girder structure. Each pier 
and the half span on either side acts as a cantilever connected 
to its neighbour by an expansion joint and linkages. The 
superstructure is supported by wall piers and is monolithic 
with the piers. In terms of foundations, the piers are each 
supported by two 2.4m diameter concrete shell piles under-
reamed at the pile base, whilst the abutments are supported by 
steel H piles. At the abutments, the box girder is seated on 
three square elastomeric bearings. A row of 6 hold-down rods 
anchored on the inside of the bottom flange of the box girder 
prevent uplift of the end spans under live loading. This bridge 
has a complex geometry, being longitudinally sloped and 
moderately curved in the horizontal plane (concave side facing 
east). 
 
Figure 21: General view of Clarence River Bridge. 
 
(a) Abutment cracking 
 
(b) Hold down rod residual 
deformation 
 
(c) Deck settlement 
 
(d) Concrete spalling at pier 
base 
 
(e) Damaged pile cap 
Figure 22: Observed damage at the Clarence River Bridge. 
Most of the damage observed at the Clarence River Bridge 
occurred at the substructure level. The northern abutment 
suffered cracking of the west wing wall and vertical cracks at 
the joint between the back wall and transverse shear key on 
the east side of the abutment (Figure 22a). The southern 
abutment was undamaged. Of the 5 piers, only the 2nd pier 
from the northern end of the bridge was observed to be 
damaged. Concrete spalling around the pier base was observed 
(Figure 22d) in addition to a large diagonal crack in pile cap 
(Figure 22e). Similar cracking damage was reported in the pile 
caps at a number of the other piers. The diagonal crack in the 
pile cap implies a vertical punching shear failure had begun to 
manifest due to the earthquake shaking. At the southern 
abutment, the vertical hold downs at the tip of the cantilever 
span had pulled out of the bottom of the box girder causing 
concrete spalling (Figure 22c). Based on the appearance of a 
reduced clearance between the abutment seat and the deck 
soffit the deck appeared to have dropped vertically. At the 
northern abutment, the vertical hold down rods did not pull 
through the box girder but were pressed against one side of the 
surrounding duct (Figure 22b) indicating that the deck had a 
residual displacement towards the east. 
 
(a) Approach settlement 
(Mororimu Stream) 
 
(b) Abutment fill settlement 
(Clarence River) 
 
(c) Soil gapping (Clarence 
River) 
 
(d) Soil gapping (Mororimu 
Overbridge) 
 
(e) Lateral approach spread (Clarence River) 
Figure 23: Geotechnical damage observed at surveyed 
Kaikōura district bridges. 
Geotechnical Observations 
Approach settlement was observed at all bridges examined in 
this district (Figure 23a). At the Mororimu Stream and 
Overbridge, the settlement was extreme, being measured to be 
100mm. At the Clarence River Bridge, the presence of 
settlement slabs lessened the direct impact of approach 
settlement so that there was no abrupt step between the 
approach level and deck level, however, settlement at the 
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northern end of the bridge was large enough to cause a 25mm 
wide crack in the asphalt where the approach slab meets the 
abutment. Settlement and slumping of fill below the abutment 
pile caps and footings (Figure 23b) was observed at all bridges 
in addition to soil gapping around some of the piers (Figure 
23c and d). A severe case of transverse approach spreading 
was also observed at the southern end of the Clarence River 
Bridge (Figure 23e). The geotechnical damage does not appear 
to be due to liquefaction due to the lack of ejecta and lack of 
fracturing of the ground surface. 
Non-Structural Elements and Utilities 
Road surface damage in the form of fissures, cracks, or breaks 
was observed. None of the bridges described in this section 
carry utilities.  
MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT 
In the Marlborough district, a total of 11 bridges were 
inspected: four on SH63 south of Blenheim, two single lane 
local road bridges approximately 7km northeast of Blenheim; 
and five SH1 bridges south of Blenheim. The bridges 
inspected on SH63, along with the two local road bridges 
north of Blenheim did not show any sign of earthquake 
damage. The majority of these bridges were multi-span, 
simply supported reinforced concrete bridges with mono pier-
pile hammerhead piers. Figure 24 contains a selection of 
photos showing the undamaged bridges The SH1 bridges in 
the Marlborough district inspected at the time of the 
reconnaissance were the Awatere River Bridge, Flaxbourne 
River Bridge, Needles Creek Bridge, Waima River Bridge and 
Waima Overbridge. All of these bridge were found to have 
sustained earthquake induced damage. 
Early Seismic Standards – 1930’s to Mid-1970’s 
The Flaxbourne River (Figure 25a) and Needles Creek (Figure 
25b) Bridges were built in the 1950’s and are both 5 span 
structures supported on wall piers. In the case of the Needles 
Creek Bridge, the structure is entirely integral unlike the 
Flaxbourne River Bridge where the superstructure is simply 
supported on the piers and is only connected to the piers by 
eight vertical, 32mm diameter dowel bars (two per beam). 
The Flaxbourne River Bridge suffered damage to both the 
substructure and superstructure (Figure 26), whereas the 
Needles Creek Bridge mainly suffered substructure damage. A 
point of similarity between the Needles Creek and Flaxbourne 
River bridges in terms of structural damage was the separation 
of the deck from the piers and abutments due to excessive 
lateral loading. In the case of the Flaxbourne River Bridge, the 
vertical dowel bars connecting the deck to the piers and 
abutment were not sufficient to provide the horizontal shear 
strength necessary to withstand the lateral seismic demand 
from the deck. Over the piers, the vertical bars had broken the 
surrounding cover concrete, bent the confining transverse 
reinforcement and in some cases fractured (Figure 27a). Over 
the first pier from the southern end it appeared that all of these 
vertical bars had fractured. This damage was more severe on 
the first two piers at the southern end of the bridge. The deck 
had moved from its original position in a south west direction 
over these piers (Figure 27b). The two piers closest to the 
southern abutment appeared to be less damaged than the other 
two piers where the deck-pier connection was not as badly 
damaged. At the third pier from the south end of the bridge an 
angled crack was observed at the top of the pier indicating that 
the pier-beam connection had started to fail the concrete plinth 
in shear.  
 
(a) Wairau River (Wash) SH63 
 
(b) Wye River SH63 
 
(c) Ferry Bridge, Ferry Road, Spring Creek 
Figure 24: Selection of undamaged bridges west and north 
of Blenheim. 
 
(a) Flaxbourne River SH1 
 
(b) Needles Creek SH1 
Figure 25: Flaxbourne River and Needles Creek Bridges. 
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Figure 26: Damage schematics of the Flaxbourne River Bridge. 
 
In terms of substructure damage at the Flaxbourne River 
Bridge, plastic hinging occurred in the foundations at both 
abutments as well as cracking with reinforcement exposure 
and buckling at the base of some of the piers. At the southern 
abutment, plastic hinging occurred at the top of the foundation 
columns that extend above the strip footing (Figure 27c); and 
at the other abutment, plastic hinges formed at the top of the 
piles. Concrete spalling was more significant at the south 
abutment, fully exposing the longitudinal reinforcement of the 
abutment columns.  
 
(a) Damaged deck – pier 
connection 
 
(b) Residual transverse 
displacement of the deck 
relative to the pier 
 
(c) Exposed reinforcing of the 
abutment columns 
 
(d) Residual longitudinal deck 
displacement 
Figure 27: Abutment and superstructure damage at the 
Flaxbourne River Bridge. 
The abutment columns were observed to use plain round bars 
with widely spaced stirrups. At the same abutment, the 
transverse capping beam on the columns had moved 200 mm 
towards the river. Also, there was clear signs of longitudinal 
movement of the beam diaphragm on top of the abutment seat 
(Figure 27d). At the north abutment, cracking of the piles 
extended across the depth of the pile with spalling occurring 
on both the front and back faces of the piles. 
 
(a) Tilted pier 
 
(b) Pier elevation showing 
base cracking 
 
(c) Close up of crack at the 
pier base 
 
(d) Buckled longitudinal 
reinforcement 
Figure 28: Pier damage at the Flaxbourne River Bridge. 
The pier-pile cap interface was only able to be accessed at the 
three piers closest to the northern end of the bridge and 
cracking at the pier base was observed at all of these piers. 
The same piers were observed to be tilted in the longitudinal 
direction such that the tops of the piers had moved south 
(Figure 28a). At the base of the piers a single crack was 
observed to extend through the entire pier-pile cap interface 
(Figure 28b). Exposure and buckling of longitudinal bars was 
observed for the two northernmost piers (Figure 28c and d). At 
the northernmost pier there was evidence that the pier had slid 
on the crack interface approximately 10mm towards the river 
channel. 
At Needles Creek Bridge, significant plastic hinging at the top 
and bottom of the piers occurred. However, single cracks 
instead of distributed cracks tended to form (Figure 29a). The 
cracks were particularly wide at the two piers at the north end 
of the bridge. At the pier closest to the north abutment, 
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exposure and buckling of the longitudinal bars was evident at 
the top of the pier. This pier also had a residual tilt of about 3° 
from vertical (Figure 29b). The manner of the tilt was such 
that the bottom of the pier D appeared to have moved towards 
the waterway. The mode of cracking of the piers and 
abutments (over the entire width of the bridge) (Figure 29d) 
indicates that lateral spreading effects were significant at this 
bridge [4]. 
 
(a) Typical cracking at the top 
of the piers 
 
(b) Tilted pier 
 
(c) Cracking at the top of the 
abutment piles 
 
(d) Cracking of the abutment-
deck connection 
Figure 29: Observed structural damage at the Needles Creek 
Bridge. 
Early Ductile Standards – Mid 1970’s to Late 1980’s 
The Waima River (Ure) (Figure 30a) and Waima Overbridge 
(Figure 30b) were constructed in 1975 and 1985, respectively, 
and are located just over 1km apart on SH1. The Waima river 
bridge has eight simple spans and uses two precast prestressed 
I beams seated on 1.5m diameter, circular, mono-pile, 
hammerhead piers. This bridge was seismically retrofitted in 
2003 with external steel shear keys to prevent unseating of the 
deck (Figure 31a). The Waima Overbridge, is a corrugated 
steel multi-plate arch tunnel approximately 114m long and 
having a diameter of 6.75m. 
The Waima River Bridge was one of the few bridges visited in 
the Marlborough district which displayed noticeable residual 
transverse displacement of the deck. The residual deck 
displacement had two components, a rigid body translation 
towards the east and rotation in the transverse west direction 
between the abutments with the maximum transverse 
displacement of the deck being near the middle of the bridge. 
The deck was also twisted about its longitudinal axis with the 
southbound lane higher than the northbound lane. Cracking 
and spalling of concrete was observed around the retrofitted 
steel brackets restraining longitudinal movement of the precast 
I-beams (Figure 31c). In terms of damage to the substructure, 
cracking was observed at both abutments in addition to 
cracking of the top of the abutment piles (Figure 31b). The 
second (Figure 31d) and third piers from the southern 
abutment were observed to have noticeable tilting westward. 
Flexural cracking was observed around the base of the second 
pier from the southern end of the bridge just above water level 
at the edge of the waterway, and measured to be 
approximately 1mm wide. At the time of reconnaissance, only 
pier damage above ground and water level could be observed 
and appeared to be minor. However, investigation by Opus 
International Consultants after the reconnaissance (Figure 33) 
show that pier plastic hinging had occurred below ground 
level and that only cracking of the concrete occurred within 
the plastic hinge region. 
 
(a) Waima River (Ure) Bridge SH1 
 
(b) Waima Overbridge SH1 
Figure 30: General views of the Waima River and 
Overbridge Bridges. 
 
 
(a) View of the south abutment 
 
(b) Cracking of the pile – 
abutment interface 
 
(c) Spalling of concrete 
around the retrofitted steel 
brackets attached to the beams 
 
(d) Slight tilting of the first 
pier from the southern 
abutment westward 
Figure 31: Structural damage observed at the Waima River 
Bridge. 
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Figure 32: Damage schematics for the Waima Overbridge. 
 
The damage observed at the Waima Overbridge was mainly 
geotechnical in nature (Figure 32). This is described in the 
following geotechnical damage section. The main structural 
damage observed was a flattening of the west side of the arch 
at the southern end of the structure (Figure 34a) and cracking 
and spalling of the concrete surround at the southern end of 
the overbridge (Figure 34d) in proximity of the concrete 
foundation. The flattening of the arch was large enough to 
crack the paint protective coating on the corrugated steel 
section (Figure 34b and 34c). 
  
Figure 33: Typical pier damage observed after excavation 
and dewatering [courtesy of OPUS International Ltd]. 
 
(a) Flattened southern end of 
overbridge 
 
(b) Close up of flattened side 
of arch lining 
 
(c) Cracked surface coating at 
flattened part of the arch 
lining 
 
(d) Cracking of concrete 
surround at the southern end 
Figure 34: Observed damage at the Waima Overbridge. 
Current Standards – Post 2003 
Of the bridges visited, the Awatere River Bridge (Figure 35) is 
the newest structure, being constructed in 2007. It is a 10- 
span structure having spans of approximately 27m. The 
superstructure consists of 1.2m deep precast pre-stressed U 
beams which are made integral with the piers buy casting in-
situ diaphragms and is seated on elastomeric bearings at the 
abutment. The deck is continuous along the length of the 
structure and the substructure consists of pier bents made up of 
two 1m diameter, 5.5m long circular columns each supported 
on a single 1.2m steel cased drilled pile. 
 
Figure 35: Awatere River Bridge looking north. 
The Awatere River Bridge sustained flexural cracking at the 
top of the columns (the pier-pile interface was underground at 
most piers), at the piers near the abutments, and spalling of 
concrete at the top and bottom of the columns at the piers 
close to and at the middle of the bridge (Figures 36 and 37b-
d). The bridge deck at the Kaikōura side abutment appeared to 
have a residual displacement in the southeast direction based 
on the residual displacement of the elastomeric bearings 
(Figure 37a). The cracking and spalling in the pier columns 
mainly occurred at locations where the concrete had been 
previously repaired with mortar after the 2013 Seddon 
earthquake (Figure 37d). 
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Figure 36: Damage schematics for the Awatere River Bridge. 
 
 
 
(a) Bearing at Seddon end 
abutment showing residual 
deck displacement 
 
(b) View of damaged pier bent 
near the middle of the bridge 
 
(c) Concrete spalling observed 
at the base of the columns near 
the middle of the bridge 
 
(d) Exposed reinforcing at the 
column top after spalling of 
the repaired concrete 
Figure 37: Structural damage at the Awatere River Bridge. 
Geotechnical Observations 
Approach settlement was observed at all of the bridges except 
the Awatere River Bridge and Waima Overbridge. In the case 
of the Awatere River Bridge, it is to the author’s knowledge 
that the abutments are of the Mechanically Stabilised Earth 
(MSE) wall type and that the lack of settlement is likely to be 
due to the soil reinforcement preventing spreading of the fill 
under earthquake shaking. The most severe case of approach 
settlement occurred at the Waima River Bridge (Figure 38b), 
100mm settlement at the southern approach). Settlement of the 
fill on the abutment slopes beneath the bridges at the Awatere 
River (Figure 38d), Flaxbourne River, and Needles Creek 
bridges was also observed. In terms of superficial evidence of 
liquefaction, an isolated case of ejecta was observed around a 
few pier-piles of the railroad bridge parallel to the Waima 
River Bridge (approximately 50m upstream) as shown in 
Figure 38a. Lateral spreading cracks in the roadway were 
observed at the Waima River (Figure 38c), whilst, lateral 
spreading of the creek banks and abutment fill were observed 
at the Needles Creek bridge. A severe case of soil gapping 
measuring 100mm was observed at Needles Creek Bridge. 
The damage which occurred at the Waima Overbridge was 
mainly geotechnical in nature. Significant soil settlement of 
the fill above the arch occurred on the seaward side at the 
southern end of the structure, resulting in a noticeable dip in 
the shoulder of the southbound lane (Figure 39). It is believed 
that the flattening of the tunnel lining on the southwest side 
was due to settlement of the fill on the southeast side causing 
unbalanced lateral earth pressure which the flexible lining 
could not sustain resulting in permanent deformation. More 
geotechnical details are reported in Stringer et al. [4]. 
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(a) Liquefaction ejecta 
 
(b) Large approach settlement 
(Orange spray paint) 
 
(c) Lateral spread crack at 
bridge approach 
 
(d) Settlement of abutment fill 
Figure 38: Geotechnical damage observed in the 
Marlborough District. 
 
Figure 39: Fill settlement and spread at the Waima 
Overbridge. 
Non-structural elements and utilities 
At the Flaxbourne River, Needles Creek, and Waima 
Overbridge the guardrails were damaged around areas where 
soil settlement and spreading occurred. The only observed 
damage to utilities was at Needles Creek Bridge where several 
small diameter plastic pipes may have been dislodged from 
attachments at deck level. 
BRIDGE PERFORMANCE IN CONTRAST TO THE 
CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE (2010-11)  
The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (2010-11) (CES) 
resulted in strong ground shaking and ground deformation 
damage to various infrastructure in Christchurch, thereby 
setting up a benchmark in terms of damage observations, 
repair strategies, loss estimations, etc. The bridge performance 
contrast observed during the two earthquakes can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Most of the damage observed to road bridges during the 
CES was attributed to liquefaction and lateral spreading 
effects [9]. Whereas, the dominant cause of damage during 
the Kaikōura Earthquake is mainly attributed to ground 
shaking intensity. 
 The dominant damage mode during the CES was approach 
settlement and rotation of abutments due to liquefaction 
induced lateral spreading. Whereas, the dominant damage 
mode during the Kaikōura Earthquake was pier plastic 
hinging. 
 In terms of structural characteristics, most of the bridges in 
Christchurch are short, wide, low in height, and of 
monolithic construction. Whereas, the bridges in the areas 
worst affected by the Kaikōura Earthquake are long, single 
/ two lane bridges with relatively tall (and mostly column) 
piers. These differences in structural characteristics 
between bridges is another factor in the differences in 
observed damage between the bridges affected by the CES 
against those affected by the Kaikōura Earthquake. This is 
because pier flexural loading is much less for bridges with 
short piers in addition to the wide decks increasing the 
transverse stiffness of the bridge, reducing the transverse 
displacement demand on the piers. 
 Damage to bridges in general was observed to be worse 
from the Kaikōura Earthquake, in contrast to the CES. 
However, most of the bridges were open (with restricted 
access and speed in some cases), apart from the Wandle 
River Bridge. This is in contrast, to the bridges in 
Christchurch; where some were closed for repair (a couple 
for more than a week), even though the bridges performed 
better [10].  
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES 
This paper provided a brief overview of the structural 
performance of bridges across the Marlborough, Hurunui and 
Kaikōura districts observed during the Kaikōura Earthquake. 
At the time of initial inspection, the bridges had been rapidly 
assessed and were generally only open to emergency traffic. 
Since then, temporary repair works have allowed public access 
through these routes, but, long term repair/replacement 
strategies are still being considered by the managing 
authorities. From the perspective of life safety we can consider 
the overall performance satisfactory. However, based on the 
observed undesirable sub-system performance of the damaged 
bridges further investigation into possible improvements of the 
current design philosophy is warranted. Some discussion 
points are herein listed and proposed as potential further 
research areas: 
1. Collapse Prevention Limit State: Bar buckling and 
fracture. Can we confidently predict when buckling and 
fracture will occur? Also, is it acceptable to have either 
buckling or fracture occurring at the collapse limit state? 
2. At the Awatere River Bridge, cracking and spalling 
occurred where previous cracking and spalling had been 
repaired after the Seddon earthquake. Given a further and 
possibly stronger aftershock, what is the residual fatigue 
life of the reinforcement?  
3. Wall pier bridges and multi-pier bents appear to have 
sustained less residual drift than some of their mono-pile 
pier counterparts. Should the design philosophy of mono-
pile piers be rethought on the basis that the piers and 
foundations have low structural redundancy in case of 
failure? 
4. Very high vertical accelerations occurred near the 
epicentre during the Kaikōura Earthquake leading to deck 
unseating and displacement of bearing pads on a number 
of simply supported deck bridges. Should the way 
elastomeric bearings are attached to bridges be rethought 
in order to prevent separation of the bearings from the 
deck? And more importantly is the bearing shear-axial 
interaction properly captured within the Bridge Manual 
recommendations? 
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5. Should the substructure repair strategy for bridges be 
given more consideration during the conceptual phase of 
design? This question arises from the observation that the 
ease of reparability/strengthening depends largely on the 
choice of the type of substructure (pier and foundation). 
6. Many services (especially pipes) were damaged across the 
abutment-deck joint. This was due to a lack of 
consideration of displacement compatibility between the 
bridge and the utility lines. Should there be a change or 
improvement in the way utility providers work with bridge 
designers in order to capture the interaction between the 
bridge and utilities? 
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